Abstract. We prove the existence of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) for nonstationary undiscounted infinite-horizon dynamic games with alternating moves. A suitable finite-horizon equilibrium relaxation, the ending state constrained MPE, captures the relevant features of an infinite-horizon MPE for a long enough horizon, under a uniformly bounded reachability assumption.
Introduction
The traditional approach to prove the existence of equilibria of infinitehorizon games relies heavily on the continuity of payoff functionals. The procedure begins by proving the existence of finite-horizon equilibria and follows by taking limits as the horizon diverges. Compactness of the infinitehorizon strategy space or the history space is usually required to ensure the existence of a limit point which will inherit by continuity the desired properties; see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine (Refs. 1-2), Harris (Ref. 3) , and Borgers (Ref. 4) .
In dynamic games with undiscounted or average reward payoffs, this approach fails, since the infinite-horizon payoff functionals are not continuous. Moreover, since future rewards are as valuable as present rewards, endof-horizon effects are magnified; thus, there may exist infinite-horizon and finite-horizon equilibria of a substantially different nature. In other words, there are infinite-horizon equilibrium strategies that are not the limit of finite-horizon equilibrium strategies. These issues have been examined recently by Engwerda (Ref. 5) in the context of linear-quadratic games.
In this paper, we provide a new proof of the existence of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in the context of infinite-horizon nonstationary undiscounted dynamic games with alternating moves. The proof relies on a new method to overcome end-of-horizon effects as in Schochetman and Smith (Ref. 6) . The idea is to restrict the deviation possibilities for players by forcing an ending target state for every finite horizon. This relaxation leads to the definition of a constrained MPE. A uniformly bounded reachability assumption, which essentially requires that every player in isolation can partially control the state dynamics, ensures that play in early periods (as opposed to play in late periods) is more relevant in identifying profitable deviations in the long run. Carlson We denote by Π i (T) the set of all such strategies for player i∈{1, 2}. We refer to the 2-tuple π T ∈Π 1 (T)BΠ 2 (T) as a Markov strategy combination and denote by Π(T) the set of all such strategy combinations.
The set of T-long feasible sequences of action profiles that players may exert is commonly referred to as the history space,
We shall also denote by h π T T (s 0 )∈H(T) the feasible history induced by strategy combination π T from the initial state s 0 . The total sum of rewards per stage for feasible history h π T T (s 0 )∈H(T) is given by
Similarly, we shall denote by
the feasible history of play induced by strategy combination π T from intermediate state s k ∈S at time period k. As above, the payoff obtained for this case will be denoted by
The extension of a dynamic game, when there is an infinite number of stages to play, follows straightforwardly by setting the history space to be the infinite Cartesian product
We shall denote by Π the set of all infinite-horizon feasible strategy combinations. The total aggregated reward received by player i under the infinitehorizon strategy combination π is defined as follows:
where π T stands for the T-horizon truncation of the infinite-horizon strategy combination π.
Finally, in a game with alternating moves, players revise their actions in alternation: player 1 at odd periods kG1, 3, 5, . . . , and player 2 at even periods kG0, 2, 4, 6 . . . . Formally,
for even k. 
where (γ This definition carries over straightforwardly to the infinite-horizon setting with the above introduced framework.
We denote Π*(T) and Π* the set of all Markov perfect equilibrium strategies for the T-horizon and infinite-horizon games, respectively. 
We denote by Π*(T, s) the set of all constrained MPE to state s.
Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria
We make the following standing assumptions. (i) Discreteness. Each set A i k is discrete and finite; hence, the history space H is compact in the product topology and Π is compact in the topology L (see the Appendix for a brief discussion).
( 
Similarly, firm 2 chooses prices only in even numbered periods,
Hence, at time period k, the firm i instantaneous reward r i k (·) is a function of the state, i.e., the price that firm j sets on period kA1, say p j k , and the action, i.e. the price that firm i will establish p i k . The set of feasible pricing decisions (say P) is discrete and finite, goods are perfect substitutes that is, the firms share the market equally whenever they charge the same price. Firms have the same unit cost c. Let D k (·) denote the market demand function at time period k. The total reward at time period k is given by
Then,
Strategies are Markovian in that they depend on the current state, i.e., the rival action in the last period. Hence, the set of all histories is the same as the set of all feasible sequences of states.
Consider the infinite history hG{(p
Now, let us assume that p 
Existence Results.
The intuition for the next result lies in the fact that, under the uniformly bounded reachability assumption, a sequence of finite-horizon constrained MPE will encompass all possible deviations (and not just the constrained deviations) as the horizon diverges to infinity. Compactness of the strategy space ensures that every sequence of constrained MPE has a converging subsequence, and the limit strategy will be an MPE for the infinite-horizon game, by the above argument. Proof. Let us first show that
for any player i who would deviate by playing γ i ∈Π from the initial state s 0 . We recall that h Hence, by hypothesis on π T , we have
By cost boundedness and the choice of T N and γ r t i , we have that total payoff accrued, up to period N, satisfies
Then, iterating on this construction, we have that
Thus, from the initial state, the proposed deviation is not profitable. For a deviation from any other state s k ∈S with 0Fk, we use the same argument. ᮀ By a standard compactness argument the existence of MPE follows. Proof. By Assumption 2.1 and the alternating move structure, via backward induction one can always construct a sequence {π T : π T ∈ Π*(T, s T )} T of constrained MPE for the infinite feasible sequence of states sG(s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . .); see Aliprantis (Ref. 10) . Then, by compactness of the strategy space, there exists a converging subsequence, say {π
with respect to L .
Finally, by Lemma 3.1, π∈Π*. ᮀ
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a new approach to determine the existence of MPE in infinite-horizon nonstationary undiscounted dynamic games. The approach relies heavily on the structural properties of the game (the so called uniformly bounded reachability assumption). A new solution concept (the constrained MPE) for the finite-horizon game, captures the relevant features of an infinite-horizon MPE for a long enough horizon, under the aforementioned structural assumption.
An application to an asyncronous dynamic duopoly is presented. Of further research interest is the application of the techniques introduced here to linear-quadratic dynamic games [see Lau (Ref. 11) ] where an analytical representation of the constrained MPE is possible.
Appendix: Topologies on the Set Π
Since our interest is to study the convergence of finite-horizon equilibrium strategies to infinite-horizon equilibrium strategies, it is very important to define carefully the relevant topologies on Π, and consequently the different notions of convergence which they induce. For a complete study, the interested reader is referred to Harris (Ref. 3) .
We will adopt the convention that any finite-horizon strategy combination is trivially extended through any feasible choice of a continuation sequence of strategies, so that this extension is an element of Π.
First, we concentrate on a topology for H. 
